Is the analysis model that the Democracy and Spirituality association is doing every effort to lay down likely to clarify the debate on the referendum? To answer this question, let us look at it with hindsight.

Democracy and Spirituality: the words are to be considered in their connection and in the given order. We are neither talking about religion and politics (where the politic is used by religion in its effort to eliminate what it describes as evil by coercion) nor about religion and democracy (where religion intends to force democracy into accepting its ideas). Instead, we are firstly referring to democracy but to a lofty and even transcendent conception of it which shall in any manner be purely procedure-defined: democracy is thus conceived as a true spiritual demand based on everybody’s dignity, listening, sharing and solidarity, the desire for power control, non-violence and the concern that anyone has the opportunity to devote himself. And simultaneously, but not after (i.e. the real meaning of “and”), we are referring to a genuine spirituality: being in line with democracy (as indicated by the above-mentioned enumeration) such spirituality is also aware it might drift towards either sectarian or intolerant perversion; this risk is all the more probable as it tends to be radical. We are thus talking about a spirituality which feels and accepts the need for a democratic framework and regulation, a democratic context in order to protect itself against its own potential excesses, should it be by hint of some kind of relativism.

As a result a mutual fertilization and a reciprocal support between democracy and spirituality are sought. Democracy and spirituality do need each other: they complement each other and partly tally. And as the expression goes, they are to be distinguished but not separated, to be united but not merged. This is one of our era’s double and strong demand which proves to be essential so that the great variety of issues it has to deal with can be under control.

Such frame of reference, which is being developed in several versions, is in any way a ready-made model. And this is one of the greatest difficulties to be faced. In view of any new situation, the new versions are to be devised from an existential viewpoint. When they are both personal and collective, such inventions may well be still jeopardized by overindividualism or overauthoritarianism, as well as by too much permissiveness or radicalism.

With two questions, let us try to apply such thinkings to the current debate on Europe.

Three viewpoints will be analysed to answer such question.
a) At the time when it was founded, in the 1950’s, the European Union did correspond to one of those rare moments when a “true spiritual policy” is embodied.

The conjunction of three factors made it possible:
- the ethical capacity to deal with evil head-on, without shirking responsibility and to propose a union where division used to reign and split; the pooling of subsoil, coal and steel products did symbolize this union;
- the political and institutional innovative capacity which the creation of a body – the the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community characterizes; in charge of defining the Community’s general interest, this body is the sole competent for putting forward proposals in order to achieve such interest;
- the particularly strong personal interest of “Europe’s founding fathers” (Schuman, Adenauer, de Gasperi).

We realize, then, these three conditions are not really met today. If we had true leaders capable to innovate and give Europe the required impetus, things would be much easier! In such context, we would cease considering the draft constitution as an end in itself. It would be what it should be: a means of achieving a plan.

b) Though, and particularly since the enlargement, the EU is shaping an original and unprecedented political model aimed at reconciling diversity and unity.

Setting up a common democratic political framework for 25 countries which have all take their turn to conquer one another is not an easy task; and this is all the more diffucult as most of them, at one moment in their history, have experienced an imperial vocation and thus had a taste for greatness which results in a quite natural pride. In addition, every EU member country has had its own way to shape its identity.

Common prevailing trends, bound to bring about some level of unity (the Greek, then the Roman and Byzantine worlds, followed by Islam, then Christianity, the Enlightenment, democracy, marxism, secularization and the Welfare State) have existed, we cannot deny it. Though Europe is a strongly-history shaped land whose past is not to be forgotten, such aspect is not liable to promote unity but division. Overcoming it through the adoption of a non-imperalist attitude based on voluntary agreement and free support (but without refusing diversity which is a source of wealth) proves to be not only an ethical demand but also a risky and fragile political feat. If not properly supported, the building is likely to collapse at any time.

In such context, setting up a classical-type federal model (transferring sovereignty without defining how it will be used) results to be impossible. Delegating limited and conditional competences with a view to carrying out common projects (particularly in the economic and monetary fields) has been the basis of Europe’s building. In the meanwhile, EU states and governments have always had their say and been given a right of control (unanimity principle when key decisions are at stake).

When compared with such framework, the draft constitution further promotes the creation of a political community with its own values and competences, its identity, a two-and-a-half-year mandate president; and national governments do still have their word to say. An unprecedented political model is thus devised. It encapsulates at the same time federal-type elements (exclusive competences of the Union, that is the customs union, competition rules and the monetary policy), community elements when the Commission is the sole competent body to have a right of initiative (shared and supporting competences), intergovernmental elements when the unanimity rule prevails (foreign policy, budget, revising the constitution) and, at last, other elements for which member states have the sole competence. These are not contained in the constitution: civil and criminal law, most part of social law and the freedom of religion. The Union does not have any ordinary general competence: all its competences are conferred upon it.

Such a sui generis model is at the same time innovative, interesting and fragile. Its capacity to arouse support and backup and to gradually shape a European opinion – for want of a European people – is essential.

Are political parties going to get organized at the European level? Are national and European political debates going to get in line instead of superimposing themselves in their own world? That is the most important point at stake. If nothing happens, then the constitution would have failed. Should such a debate be developed, and the Constitution will make Europe progress further. All things considered, the decisive element will be the citizen debate.

It is interesting, however, to highlight that participative democracy is turned by the draft constitution into a key principle of EU’s democratic life (article 47). This has never been written so clearly. The required financial means are to be devoted so that both citizens and representative associations are able “to promote and exchange their viewpoints”. If the constitutional treaty is passed, EU citizens will be given the possibility to petition the Commission for submitting a proposal to the competent bodies. As such citizen right of initiative is not provided for by the French law, this is a major step forward; and we must seize this opportunity.

The constitution being a political compromise between market and competition on the one hand and social and ecologial goals on the other hand (these are many times strongly affirmed), this is particularly true. But for now, this compromise is purely formal. Practical experience, and only political practical experience backed up by case law, will help to define its real content and to find , at last, where the right balance is (it is fully acknowledged that the current situation is obviously not satisfactory). Such considerations, however, cannot be written or if it were the case, it would guarantee nothing. The decisive elements will be practical experience, the politicians’, institutions’ and actors’ performance.

c) In such situation, what is the fair spiritual attitude to adopt about the referendum?

Of course, we have to take our decision in all conscience. But what is to be considered for us to decide ourselves: our guts, discontent, unrest, heart, passion or reason? Is our decision driven by our interest, the others’ or a common interest? And how does each of us combine those different dimensions? How do we reconcile conviction-based and responsibility-based ethics? When confronted with a difficult choice to make, the conditions of citizen ethics should be further analysed.

Here are a few hints of thinking aimed at easing your choice.

1) Is the draft constitution too much pro-religion or is religion sufficiently taken into account?

Both critics are heard at the same time. Let us try and explain why.

- The preamble does not refer to the Christian heritage and some people regretted it. Otherwise, referring to Europe’s several heritages (Islam included) would have then been compulsory.

- Article 52 stipulates that “the Union shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with churches and philosophical and non-denominational organizations”. The secularization principle is not questioned there for member states are not forced into doing so. They all do, actually, France included.

- Article II-70 (Charter) refers to “the freedom of demonstating one’s religion or faith on the individual or collective level, in public or in private, through cult, education, practice and rites ”. Would it have prevented the French law about the prohibition of religious signs at school from passing? The Constitutional Court did not think so for two reasons: the Charter only applies to the actions which fall within the Union’s sole competence whereas such a law comes under a national competence. So, is this article useless? In my opinion, it would apply in the following case: if it were prohibited to show religious signs on board a train which crosses the border of a EU country, the free movement - which is a competence of the EU -. would be challenged.

2) Does the draft constitution enable us to reconcile the legitimate right to identity and respect for otherness with the shaping of a true community (in which being together prevails over the disagreements linked to the way of being together).
Such reconciling would symbolize a true spiritual capacity as sought by Democracy and Spirituality.

To answer this question, we have to distinguish between the draft constitution and the citizens’ acceptance capacity in terms of behaviour. The draft constitution respects the former two demands (identity and otherness); the third one (community) is its weakness. Whereas we have common and better organized institutions with clarified competences, there are very few new competences. This has made necessary the codification of both competences and the existing majority rules in a special part. In addition, the unanimity voting procedure is maintained in key fields (including, in particular, the revision of the constitution).

Is this structure out of step with EU citizens’ attitude or does it meet their major expectation which, rightly or wrongly, is still mistrust-marked? In other words, are we all ready to live together with other people who are different from us and to equally share our decision-making power? Every country and every citizen is to give his answer. Pro-sovereignty people refuse such choice and they have the right to do so. Many people, however, seem to be willing to answer no in the name of a different, more federal-based and more social-driven Europe, in the name of their Europe. But does such Europe really exist? That is the question.

In this respect, I would like to pinpoint what I consider as three typically French perversions.

- dreaming of a Europe which would embody a larger France without its weaknesses, but with our legislative system and state model. In my opinion, such attitude reveals our relation to the other is so particularly difficult that it requires the intervention of a state’s peacekeeping force based on a defined, clear and precise legal system to operate. Yet, other EU countries’ legal sytems are vaguer and constantly evolving for their resulting from compromises between different interests. The case-law-derived model like the one set up by the Council of State prevails on the civil law system. Nonetheless, what should be the right solution to achieve a compromise between 25 countries?
- the idea that the French social model is to be either preserved or promoted. This proves to be less and less true. Though France has a true health insurance system (which is maintained) and public services (which are maintained), its collective relationship model has never been able to operate but with state’s support (since 1936) and has kept on declining. In addition, regarding employment, our “model” has turned into a “counter-model”: in this field, indeed, we are the dunces of the class and Europe has nothing to do with it.

- the governments’ lack of European civic responsibility when they not fulfill their EU commitments (when choosing not to respect the stability pact, for example, with a view to reducing income tax), fail to explain what the EU really means and blame the Union for being responsible for bad news or unpopular reforms.

3) The question of social Europe

The constitution presenting both liberal and social aspects is the main reason for misunderstanding. Promoting social Europe, curbing unemployment and fighting exclusion are the primary goals to be achieved. What does a social Europe exactly refer to? There are currently three existing social systems throughout Europe. The French model essentially relies on State, which regulates, debites and redistributes. Another one, labelled social-democrat system, is based on strong, responsible and independant from state social partners; the latter are concerned that state’s intervention is moderate. This model proves to be the most efficient one. The third and more liberal model is founded on the idea that any individual should be properly prepared to be able to develop his capacities on the market. Tony Blair is doing so with a view to making up for the ultra-liberal reforms carried out by M. Thatcher ; these had been mainly inspired (but not excused) by the English labour doctrine corporatist decline.

In any case, the community feels it has a protection duty in relation to individuals; a minimum European social basis is thus identified compared with the US economic liberalism. Once we acknowledge that, what do we mean when referring to social Europe? The dominance of one of those three models? A combination of them? Achieving common objectives while having the choice of the appropriate means (the latter is the currently applied formula)? Each EU country being attached to its model and identifying itself to it, no clear answer can be found to such question for the moment.

It depends, similarly, on circumstances and disposition. The choice can be clarified, though.

In this respect, I shall comment on two points.

- Neither the constitution nor the current treaties binding EU’s 25 member countries - and which would remain the common law should the constitution not be adopted – are marble-graved.

- Political, social and environmental objectives are further developed by the constitution than by current treaties; in addition it includes both flexible and adaptation elements which are currently not provided for (this is the much-talked-about “conversion clause”, which makes it possible to shift from unanimity to majority voting and again to the unanimity procedure, the ratification process by every member state, (which is a rather unwieldy step) not being required.

In my opinion, the right question to be asked in view of such situation is as follows. Is the the political desire for another Europe more likely to be efficiently developed through the laying down of a brand new framework? Or has it greater chances to be efficiently developed through such concrete though imperfect framework as the one being currently proposed? In a word, will the legitimate goals pursued by the “no” advocates – seeking for a different, more federal-based and more-social driven Europe – be rightly served by their vote? Or may the final outcome be contrary to their expectations?

Such question is legitimate. Answering “no” may correspond to an ethical attitude provided that people are concerned about the aftermath of such vote! What would it mean for Europe? There are several likely scenarios.

Once the ratification process by the 25 EU member countries is over, will France be in a position to negotiate what the “no” advocates wish to obtain if it is the sole country to reject the constitutional treaty? This seems not very probable. Should such desire for another type of Europe be harmoniously arousing in several countries, and negotiation would then be possible. Otherwise, chances are great that France will be got off the train while a new EU is taking shape. If other countries do reject the treaty, their reasons for doing so may be different. The British or Pole “no”, or both, shall not mean the same thing. Those “no”, though “pooled”, are not to be constructive. Current treaties will continue to apply but without the institutional and social progresses offered by the constitution. Operating thus without a framework, the Union is very likely to drift towards a mere free trade area.

Is thus a new framework to be devised by a small group of states? And which ones? With Germany (and the reforms carried out by Schröder)? With Berlusconi? With Zapatero (whose government has just adopted the constitutional treaty)? And how would react the left-out countries? They will certainly not be pleased! Europe’s endless squabbling will be re-established whereas the world, China, India and the United States will keep on progressing. Europe’s building is doomed by no inevitability and no determinism. Europe can be broken up at any time! Reasons for conflict between member countries are not scarce, whether EU’s budget amount and the “Bristish cheque”, the majority rules (France’s voting weight being reduced from 13% to 9% as provided by the Treaty of Nice, France’s and Germany’s one falling from 31% to 18%, which may jeopardize the CAP, in the long run), the “Christian heritage” dispute or relations with the US are concerned. Voting “no” is such context amounts to opening a Pandora’s box. Feeding the “yes” with a stronger demand would be a far better attitude to adopt, whose result will be much more productive in the long run.

The arousing citizen driving force would be wasted if it were worn out in laying down a new constitutional framework: there will be little difference with the currently proposed one, or Europe will be broken up into 25 opposing blocs. So, instead of spreading so thinly such growing citizen mobilization in uncertain-or-counter-productive-result efforts, we would better invest in the proposed framework to provide it with immediate maximum impact and strength.

All these thinkings lead us to the same conclusion: whether the “yes” or the “no” wins, Europe is to lay down a plan which should reconcile resistance, regulation and utopia. As it only offers a very little-improved regulation with neither clear resistance nor strongly affirmed utopia, the “yes” is currently gathering few supporters. The dangerous side of the “no” lies in its proposing a resistance without defining clearly its utopia and without offering regulations liable to implement them; utopia turns then into a dream and may well prove to be counter-productive instead of embodying “a transcended reality”. As a consequence, it is up to each side to improve its position and performance quality.